Gradual democratic transition has been
seen in Burma since the 2010 general elections. Prior to the elections,
the country’s closest allies were governments that had business
interests or groups that had established connection with the military
generals. The international community was visibly divided under two
separate camps – sanctions versus engagement.
The European Union (EU) and the United
States (US), which imposed sanctions, were sources of funding and
support for the Burmese democratic forces. The specifics of their
strategies may not have been identical, but the ultimate goal to bring
about democracy was the same. The objective of sanctions was to put
pressure on the military generals to abandon its authoritarian rule for a
democratic regime.
Some of the conditions of the Western
powers to normalize diplomatic relations were the release of political
prisoners including Aung San Suu Kyi, inclusive dialogue with the
National League for Democracy (NLD) and ethnic minorities to pave the
way for democracy, to end violence against ethnic minorities, to adhere
to the United Nations non-proliferation agreements on nuclear weapons,
and to hold a free and fair 2012 by-elections.
Since most of their demands were either
met or initiated, both the US and EU suspended sanctions in 2012, except
for arms embargo and individual sanctions to certain military leaders
and their associates. As a sign of diplomatic thaw, European Commission
chief Jose Manuel Barroso visited Burma and offered more than $100
million in development aid. The EU’s move was followed by a historic
visit of President Barack Obama, the first ever visit by a sitting US
president in November 2012.
It is evident from their policies and
actions that both EU and US have respective interests. But what are
their interests and how they intend to pursue is an interesting
development. Their benchmark for normalizing relations and conditions
for lifting sanctions seem to have certain variation.
EU’s Interest
On April 22, 2013, the EU unanimously
lifted the sanctions it suspended a year ago. At its meeting in
Luxembourg, the EU foreign ministers welcomed the changes that had taken
place in the past year and decided to lift all sanctions except arms
embargo.
Even prior to lifting sanctions, the European Commission on March 5th had
announced a package of €150 million to support the country’s democratic
reform ahead of a national election in 2015, and also pledged more EU
development money and a bilateral investment agreement.
US’s Interest
In less than two weeks of EU’s decision,
the US government on May 3, 2013 said it would lift visa ban on
officials but extend targeted sanctions for another year. The rationale
behind the action was to reward democratic progress of the past year but
also aims to prevent backsliding it from reform.
After the suspension of sanctions in
2012, bilateral trade reached $190.96 million, of which Burma’s export
to the US accounted for $16.47 million and its import was at $174.49
million. As of February 2013, the total US investments reached $243.56
million in 15 projects, accounting only for about 0.58% of the total
foreign investments in Burma since the country opened to such in late
1988.
Two days after EU sanctions was lifted,
acting US trade representative Demetrios Marantis visited Burma to
express the idea of rebuilding production and trade capacity through
Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA), which would formalize
bilateral dialogue on trade and investment issues, and the possibility
of reinstating benefits under the Generalized System of Preferences
(GSP), which allows for duty-free entry into the US of many goods from
beneficiary countries.
Different Priorities
Evidently, the EU is convinced that
changes on the ground merits the lifting of sanctions. The EU policy
move is also based on the expectation that the reform process will
continue. Aung San Suu Kyi’s support for the removal of sanctions was an
important factor in the EU’s decision. Moreover, there was no
opposition or disagreement within the EU for such action.
On the other hand, the US believes that
the reform process is inconclusive and uncertainty still remains. While
rewarding the government for its democratic reforms, the US government
maintains the flexibility to re-impose sanctions if situation warrants.
The EU hopes to help consolidate the
transition process by permanently lifting sanctions. However, the Obama
administration sees that it is premature to take such a hasty decision.
Some members in the Congress also have concerns over the transition.
By retaining targeted sanctions, the US
government intends to have the necessary leverage to punish individuals
and companies that slow or thwart the reform process. It is also aimed
at sending strong signal to human rights violators and officials who
propagate military ties with North Korea.
Lingering Concerns
There are some common concerns both the
EU and US share, including the continued incarceration of political
prisoners and the issue of Rohingya Muslims. They also have concerns on
the larger question of ethnic problems that are yet to be addressed.
Ceasefires have been signed with most of the armed groups but political
solution is yet to be discussed.
An official ceasefire has not yet been
reached with the Kachins, and recently tensions began to develop between
the Burmese military and the Shan and Wa armed groups.
While it is encouraging to see the
continued engagement of the two Western powers in the reform process, it
is also equally disheartening to see their inability to influence the
Burmese government to end conflict in ethnic territories, particularly
in Rakhine state.
The reform process is likely to continue
despite some uncertainties. But there are lingering concerns whether
the Western interests will gear toward economic and strategic
considerations rather than the consolidation of peace and democracy
across the country.
How some pressing issues will be
addressed remain to be seen. For example, is the central government
willing to grant autonomy to the country’s ethnic minorities? Is the
government, still dominated by the military, willing to amend the
undemocratic elements of the 2008 constitution ahead of the 2015 general
elections?
If answers to these questions are
negative or still doubtful, Burma may be heading toward an illiberal or a
defective democracy with the survival of certain inherent authoritarian
elements in a widely perceived democratic institutional arrangement.
There are also concerns that the wide
acceptance of the Thein Sein-led quasi-civilian government by the
Western powers may influence the NLD and other opposition parties to
accept an illiberal democracy.
source: Foreign Policy Journal
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