The European Union (EU) unanimously
lifted trade, economic, and individual sanctions imposed on Myanmar at a
meeting in Luxembourg on 22 April 2013. The arms embargo, however, will
remain in place to be reviewed next year.
Following the announcement of temporarily suspended sanctions in 2012
(subject to probation of the progress made), the EU’s decision to make
the move permanent
stemmed from its recognition of Myanmar’s commitment to sustaining the
process of democratic political reforms. Who drove the process, and what
does this withdrawal imply for both the EU and Myanmar?
A Snapshot of the Stakeholders
The Myanmar government, and major economic players within the
country, have been pushing for the lifting of reforms for several years.
On the other hand, the country’s opposition leader, Aung San Suu Kyi,
has so far been advocating the continuity of the measures as a leverage
to consistently impel reforms. However, over the past year, she has
conceded that Myanmar cannot base its national reconciliation processes
by relying on external factors forever.
On its part, the West has been observing the course of progressive
reforms since 2011 when the Thein Sein administration first established a
civil government based on democratic ideals. Although Myanmar has yet
to meet all the required benchmarks for the lifting of sanctions, the
overall political atmosphere has witnessed an overhaul that is difficult
to overlook. As UK Foreign Secretary William Hague put it, Myanmar’s
political progress has been “substantial enough and serious enough” for
the sanctions to be removed, “Doing otherwise would send the wrong
signal”. This nuanced shift in the EU’s policy no doubt gives ample
space for other interests, which have emerged against the backdrop of
the European economic crisis, to take shape.
Shifts in Policy: A Pragmatic EU
The removal clearly indicates the growing international support for
the once isolated Myanmar. However, in the wake of allegations from
human rights organisations of the continuing violations prevailing
against minorities, this move largely underscores an intriguing paradox.
What was once considered the very basis of the sanctions is no longer
the only concern of the EU in Myanmar. Access to the myriad
opportunities presented by the domestic market in Myanmar, and the
possible enhancement of the EU’s soft power by providing aid assistance
seem like the current top priorities.
Myanmar’s economy has opened to a flurried rush of keen international
investors over the last two years. Given its stance with regard to its
thus far imposed sanctions, the EU heavily lost out on developing
substantial economic relations with Myanmar. Observing countries like
China and Singapore gain much from their liberal ties; as well as
nations such as the US diversifying its strategy towards Myanmar, the
EU’s decision comes not a minute too soon.
An enhanced commercial relationship with Myanmar could help assuage
the EU’s economic disposition with higher stakes in Myanmar’s
infrastructural growth and development. A much broader aspiration of the
EU in lifting the sanctions, however, is to throw in its chips in the
geopolitical roulette that is playing out in the Asia-Pacific. Besides
the consequent visibility this move could warrant, it would also
reinforce the EU’s position of being the world’s largest humanitarian
and development aid benefactor, something that the EU aspires to
maintain.
Contextualising Consequences: The View from Myanmar
Possibly the most obvious and far-reaching implication of the EU’s
changed approach is the fact that the move has only further strengthened
the position of the present government. The initial US and EU policies,
normatively entrenched as they were, looked to ensure that the position
of opposition democratic forces within Myanmar was never undermined. In
the light of that objective, the move appears a complete reversal in
stance.
By being recognised at a global platform, the government at Naypidaw
may not have the impetus to immediately or radically reform its domestic
policies. Whilst this is not to take away from the credit due to the
government for the progress made thus far, the process has much left to
still attain. More crucially, it does nothing to constrict the
unequivocal power held for decades by certain influential players
(linked to the junta regime), who are also presently within the Thein
Sein government.
Nonetheless, the move has also relayed a strong message to the
country’s opposition and ethnic minorities. The need for
self-determination must be spurred from within, as only self-resilience
and not external reliance will sustain the ongoing reforms process. With
economic liberalisation and comprehensive linkages with the rest of the
world, domestic expectations could possibly increase the current
political space available for the entry of more democratic elements into
the system.
Since sanctions have failed to ensure the very outcomes that they
were imposed for, perhaps the internal environment of the country could
be influenced by global interdependencies stemming from enhanced
interactions. This could result in the costs of human rights abuses and
un-democratic measures becoming too much for even the government and its
stakeholders to sustain. Finally then, as the EU re-evaluates its
interests in Myanmar, it is crucial for the forces within to reflect and
make the most of these changing stances vis-à-vis attaining their own
democratically driven interests.
Nayantara Shaunik
Research Officer, SEARP, IPCS
E-mail: nayantara@ipcs.org
Research Officer, SEARP, IPCS
E-mail: nayantara@ipcs.org
source: Eurasiareview
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